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Guilty Beyond a Reasonable Doubt: A Norm
Gives Way to the Numbers
PatriciaM. Waldt
Professor Schauer's focus on the effects of criminal justice
norms on press coverage of reports or rumors of wrongdoing
outside the courthouse is an intriguing topic which, candidly, I had
never thought about before reading his paper.' Of course the newspapers flood us with stories of John Connally's involvement with
the milk producers,2 Clarence Thomas's stormy confirmation, 8
President Bush's role in Iran-Contra,' and Clark Clifford's seduction by BCCI. Like Professor Schauer, however, I come away ultimately unconvinced that the newsmaking and criminal justice
spheres have that much to say to one another. On the whole, they
are as much unlike as like one another, and where they may diverge, the justice norms are ill-suited for a public information
system.

I.

THE GROWING IRRELEVANCE OF THE REASONABLE DOUBT
STANDARD

My opening gambit is that the reasonable doubt standard is
essentially irrelevant to the everyday workings of the criminal justice system. The criminal justice system is a well-tempered clavichord, encompassing many different standards of proof governing
different responses by police, prosecutors, and courts to different
kinds and levels of evidence. "Beyond a reasonable doubt" is but
t Circuit Judge, United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit;

L.L.B. 1951, Yale Law School.
Frederick Schauer, Slightly Guilty, 1993 U Chi Legal F 83.

See, for example, Scott Armstrong and John F. Berry, Nixon Attempted, Unsuccessfully, to Halt Prosecution of Connally, Wash Post Al (Dec 28, 1979) (Connally was later
acquitted of charges of accepting $10,000 from an association of milk producers in return for

his effort to boost federal price support for milk).
See, for example, Ruth Marcus, Divided Committee Refuses to Endorse Judge
Thomas, Wash Post Al (Sept 28, 1991); Ruth Marcus, Thomas Opposition Grows Louder as
Confirmation Hearings Approach, Wash Post AS (Sept 7, 1991).
" See, for example, Walter Pincus and George Lardner, Jr., Bush Stance, Iran-Contra
Note at Odds, Wash Post Al (Oct 31, 1992).
8 See, for example, Sharon Walsh, Prosecutors:Witness Links Clifford to BCCI, Wash
Post C1 (Oct 31, 1992).
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one of these standards. It may be a household phrase thanks to
Perry Mason and Scott Turow, but it does not define how most
important decisions are made in the criminal justice system. This
growing irrelevance of the reasonable doubt standard is demonstrated at every phase of a criminal prosecution, from the initial
encounter with a law enforcement officer, to plea bargaining,
through the jury trial, and even into sentencing.
A. Police-Citizen Encounters
Take, for example, how a police-citizen encounter, which a police officer may initiate with no proof or even a "hunch" that the
citizen is a wrongdoer, can escalate into arrest, indictment, conviction, and a long prison term. Under the Fourth Amendment's cryptic ban on "unreasonable searches and seizures," a police officer
who harbors no suspicions about a citizen can nonetheless approach the citizen and ask for consent to search him and/or his
luggage 6-on

a crowded bus;7 on "trains, planes, and city streets,"8

at the workplace, 9 in a train station, bus or airport terminal, 10 or
even in his private train compartment." Appellate judges see literally hundreds of cases each year in which such a "consensual" encounter based on no tangible evidence at all produces in due time a
"reasonable suspicion" that the citizen is engaged in or about to
engage in criminal activity. This so-called "reasonable suspicion,""
in turn, permits the officer to detain the citizen for a reasonable
time (reasonable varies with the circumstances, but can stretch as
long as over an hour),'" interrogate him,"' and pat him down for
' See Terry v Ohio, 392 US 1, 19 n 16 (1968) (ask questions); Florida v Rodriguez, 469
US 1, 5-6 (1984) (ask questions); INS v Delgado, 466 US 210, 216 (1984) (sk to see identification); Florida v Royer, 460 US 491, 501 (1983) (opinion of White) (luggage search).
7 Florida v Bostick, 111 S Ct 2382, 2389 (1991).
8

Id at 2388.

' See Delgado, 466 US at 216-17 (federal agents can question workers inside factory
entrance).
" See Bostick, 111 S Ct at 2386-88.
" United States v Savage, 889 F2d 1113, 1117 (DC Cir 1989). Compare United States
v Battista, 876 F2d 201, 204-06 (DC Cir 1989) (rousing person from bed in train compartment in early morning deemed an investigative detention requiring reasonable suspicion);
United States v Bloom, 975 F2d 1447, 1455-56 (10th Cir 1992) (police-citizen encounter in
private train compartment rose to level of investigative detention requiring reasonable suspicion when officers did not tell suspect he was free to leave).
See Terry, 392 US at 30.
1 United States v Richards, 500 F2d 1025, 1029 (9th Cir 1974).
" United States v Smith, 574 F2d 882, 886 (6th Cir 1978).
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weapons (including what we call a "groin grope").16 In fact, the police response to a "reasonable suspicion" can go as far as forcing a
suspect's car to a halt on the highway, 16 approaching him with
guns drawn,1 7 handcuffing him, 8 and insisting that he enter the
police car for questioning"0 or, if he is in a bus or train terminal,
forcing him to accompany the police to a nearby room for interrogation.20 Moreover, the reasonable suspicion itself can be based on
factors as slight as the suspect fitting aspects of the notorious drug
carrier profile,2 1 including looking nervous, 2 travelling from a
"source city," 3 giving the ticket seller a phone number other than
his own,24 paying cash for the ticket, 5 buying a one-way ticket,26

" Terry, 392 US at 17 n 13; United States v Rodney, 956 F2d 295, 297 (DC Cir 1992)
(consent to search person includes consent to pat down genital area). But see Rodney, 956
F2d at 299 (Wald dissenting) (palpating genital area is so intimate and intrusive that it
exceeds the scope of general consent to search).
"6 United States v Sharpe, 470 US 675, 682 (1985).
"7 United States v Laing, 889 F2d 281, 285 (DC Cir 1989); United States v White, 648
F2d 29, 34-36 (DC Cir 1981). See also United States v Manbeck, 744 F2d 360, 377 (4th Cir
1984).
" Laing, 889 F2d at 285.
"' United States v Lego, 855 F2d 542, 545 (8th Cir 1988); United States v Rodriguez,
831 F2d 162, 166 (7th Cir 1987); Manbeck, 744 F2d at 377. Compare United States v Richardson, 949 F2d 851, 855-57 (6th Cir 1991) (placing person in squad car after he refused to
consent to a search constituted a seizure and arrest).
30 United States v Torres, 949 F2d 606, 608 (2d Cir 1991) (officer's request to step
inside a police office, without more, did not transform consensual encounter into seizure).
Compare Florida v Royer, 460 US 491, 504-05 (1983) (opinion of White) ("stop" became
illegal detention when officers requested suspect to accompany them to a police room and
retained suspect's plane ticket and identification); United States v Glover, 957 F2d 1004,
1009 (2d Cir 1992) (failure to return suspect's identification and request to accompany officers to private office amounted to a seizure); United States v Espinosa-Guerra,805 F2d
1502, 1507 n 17 (11th Cir 1986) (listing factors, including show of force and retention of
suspect's ticket or identification, that were found to convert a request to go to a private area
into a seizure).
" See, for example, United States v Mejia, 720 F2d 1378, 1380 (5th Cir 1983) (identifying elements of the drug courier profile). This "profile," while often criticized, has withstood
numerous legal challenges, including claims that it invites racial discrimination. See United
States v Taylor, 917 F2d 1402 (6th Cir 1990), rev'd on other grounds, 956 F2d 572 (6th Cir
1992) (en banc), cert denied, 113 S Ct 404 (1992). See also Victor Merina, Joe Morgan's Suit
Protests "Profile of Drug Dealer" That Led to Arrest, LA Times B6 (Aug 11, 1990) (baseball Hall of Famer Joe Morgan, singled out as possible companion of suspected black drug
courier, thrown to ground in Los Angeles Airport by drug enforcement officer); Victor Merina, Morgan Awarded $540,000 by Jurors, LA Times B1 (Feb 15, 1991) (Morgan awarded
damages for violation of his civil rights, but use of courier profile upheld).
" United States v Nurse, 916 F2d 20, 24 (DC Cir 1990). Compare Mejia, 720 F2d at
1382 (acting "abnormally calm" is one factor that gives rise to reasonable suspicion).
" United States v Sokolow, 490 US 1, 3 (1989); United States v Chin, 981 F2d 1275,
1278 (DC Cir 1992), cert denied, 113 S Ct 2377 (1993).
" Sokolow, 490 US at 3. See also Chin, 981 F2d at 1277 n 4 (failure to leave a call-back
number).
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making phone calls upon arriving at his destination, 7 not checking
luggage,28 or paradoxically being either first or last off the
airplane.2 9
The detention and body frisk justified by "reasonable suspicion," in turn, often produce the "probable cause" necessary for an
arrest. Once the evidence rises to this level, the system's response
can be-in human terms-drastic. The suspect can be handcuffed,
taken into custody, fingerprinted, booked, given a police record,
and detained until a preliminary hearing before a magistrate is
held, a lapse that in some cases may take days. s0 Where probable
cause is accompanied by so-called "exigent circumstances" that excuse waiting for a warrant, the suspect's car or apartment may be
searched inside out, including closed containers and luggage found
therein." In some cases, his insides may even be viewed by x-ray
or rectal examinations.3 2 Probable cause, like reasonable suspicion,
is a fact-dependent concept; it can consist of an anonymous tip
only the innocent parts of which are corroborated by police surveillance.33 It may depend on factors as slight as the observance of a
25 Sokolow, 490 US at 8-9; Florida v Royer, 460 US 491, 502 (1983); Chin, 981 F2d at
1277 n 4; United States v Parker, 936 F2d 950, 952 (7th Cir 1991).
" Chin, 981 F2d at 1277 n 4.
"7 United States v Hooper, 935 F2d 484, 487 (2d Cir 1991), cert denied, 112 S Ct 663
(1991).
28 United States v Craemer, 555 F2d 594, 595 (6th Cir 1977).
11 United States v Mendensall, 446 US 544, 547 n 1 (1980) (last person off); United
States v Hooper, 935 F2d at 487 (same); Buffkins v Omaha, 922 F2d 465, 468 n 7 (8th Cir
1990) (first or last); United States v Waltzer, 682 F2d 370, 373 n 3 (2d Cir 1982) (first
person off); United States v Moore, 675 F2d 802, 803 (6th Cir 1982) (same).
30 See County of Riverside v McLaughlin, 111 S Ct 1661, 1670 (1991) (to hold an arrested person more than forty-eight hours without a probable cause determination, the government must demonstrate "the existence of a bona fide emergency or other extraordinary
circumstance").
3' United States v Ross, 456 US 798, 801 (1982) (sealed package in car trunk); California v Carney, 471 US 386, 393 (1985) (motor home); California v Acevedo, 111 S Ct 1982,
1991 (1991) (closed container in car trunk); United States v Johnson, 802 F2d 1459, 1462
(DC Cir 1986) (apartment).
52 Such intrusive examinations have most often been justified in cases of persons suspected of smuggling drugs in their alimentary canals or body cavities. See United States v
Pino, 729 F2d 1357, 1359 (11th Cir 1984) (rectal examination of arriving international airline passenger suspected of drug smuggling is reasonable); United States v Montoya de
Hernandez, 473 US 531, 535 (1985) (upholding, without discussion of reasonableness of
search, drug smuggling conviction based on evidence obtained by rectal examination conducted pursuant to court order); United States v Oyekan, 786 F2d 832, 837-38 (8th Cir
1986) (strip search or x-ray of suspected drug smuggler reasonable); United States v VegaBarvo, 729 F2d 1341, 1348-50 (11th Cir 1984) (x-ray of suspected drug smuggler reasonable);
Mejia, 720 F2d at 1382 (same); United States v Ek, 676 F2d 379, 382-83 (9th Cir 1982)
(same).
33 Illinois v Gates, 462 US 213 (1983).
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brief encounter in a high-crime area, s4 giving contradictory explanations for holding someone else's checks, or appearing to hide a
during a police inbulge in one's pocket. 6 Even appearing nervous
37
cause.
probable
on
bear
can
terrogation
Once probable, cause leads to an arrest, a suspect may be detained until trial-usually months away-if the judge or magistrate determines, after a hearing, that "no [release] condition or
combination of conditions will reasonably assure the . . . safety of
any other person and the community."3 8 Federal law governing
drug felonies has a rebuttable presumption in favor of detention,

and the suspect has the initial burden of demonstrating that he is
not dangerous.3 9 Currently 42 percent of those arrested for felonies
in the federal system are detained for some period before trial.4 0
Incidentally, the legal and constitutional justification for detaining accuseds before trial under our so-called "preventive detention" laws is the very same "harm of inaction" that Professor
Schauer finds salient outside the criminal justice system, but does
not seem to think exists within it. 41 Preventive detention has been
upheld by the Supreme Court on exactly that ground: the costs of
letting certain "dangerous" suspects back on the streets can be disastrous to society at large. 2 That "cost of inaction," which should
be weighed against the harm to an unconvicted defendant of having his most basic liberty taken away, today trumps all Black-

3' See, for example, United States v Green, 670 F2d 1148, 1151 (DC Cir 1981); United
States v Trullo, 809 F2d 108, 115 (1st Cir 1987) (an encounter that gave rise to a reasonable
suspicion when it occurred in a drug-ridden neighborhood would not give rise to the same
suspicion if it occurred in a suburban neighborhood).
" United States ex rel Kirby v Sturges, 510 F2d 397, 400-01 (7th Cir 1975). See also
United States v Ervin, 907 F2d 1534, 1540 (5th Cir 1990) (giving false explanation of activities and whereabouts); United States v Holzman, 871 F2d 1496, 1503-04 (9th Cir 1989)
(denying association with another with whom observed associating).
" State v Childs, 269 NW2d 25, 27-28 (Minn 1978); United States v Lehmann, 798
F2d 692, 694 (4th Cir 1986) (attempting to hide bulge near crotch, plus some conformity to
drug courier profile, gave rise to probable cause). See also Peters v New York, 392 US 40,
66-67 (1968) ("deliberately furtive actions" strong indicia of guilt).
37 United States v Espinoza-Seanez, 862 F2d 526, 533 (5th Cir 1988).
3 Bail Reform Act of 1984, i8 USC § 3142(e) (1990).
" 18 USC § 3142(f)(1)(C) (1990).
Conversation with Jay Carver, Director, District of Columbia Pretrial Services
Agency (Jan 4, 1993).
40

Schauer, 1993 U Chi Legal F at 90 (cited in note 1).
,

United States v Salerno, 481 US 739, 750 (1987).
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stonian maxims about letting ten guilty men go free, at least in the
pretrial period."
One of the most interesting-and troubling-aspects of "consensual encounter" cases is that many citizens, when approached
by police and asked for identification and an account of their activities, assume that they must answer. Under Supreme Court holdings, the police have no duty to tell a citizen, against whom there is
no evidence at all, that she has a right not to answer questions or
to go about her business and ignore the police."' A police officer in
a recent "consensual encounter" case testified that he approaches
about sixty persons a week with no reasonable suspicion at all, and
on average hits the jackpot with at least a few of these brief encounters."" On the rare occasions when someone attempts to exercise her right to walk away,"' the consequences can be unfortunate.' 7 Although judges daily proclaim piously that a reasonable
person in those circumstances should have known she had the
right to keep going, I doubt that any judge is completely convinced
of that. Several of our D.C. Circuit cases have referred to it as a
48
convenient, albeit necessary, fiction.
The press, certainly in Washington, is very much aware of this
variety of responses by the criminal justice system to different

's A deputy attorney general recently issued a call for bail law reforms that would make
it easier to hold suspects until trial. Robert F. Howe, Justice Official Calls for Shifts in Bail
Laws, Wash Post B6 (Nov 25, 1992).
41 Florida v Bostick, 111 S Ct at 2387-88; California v Hodari D., 111 S Ct 1547, 1551
(1991); INS v Delgado, 466 US 210, 216 (1984); Brown v Texas, 443 US 47 (1979).
45 People v Jones, 545 NE2d 1332, 1359-60 (Ill App 1989) (Pincham dissenting).
" See United States v Felder, 732 F Supp 204, 205 (D DC 1990) (detective testified
that only three or four of over eighty bus and train passengers had refused to consent to be
interviewed); United States v Wilson, 953 F2d 116, 122 (4th Cir 1991).
47 Despite assurances that the "refusal to answer furnishes no basis for an arrest,"
Terry v Ohio, 392 US 1, 34 (1968) (White concurring), such a refusal may serve to escalate
the authority's investigation. See United States v Felder, 732 F Supp at 205 (when train
passengers refuse to consent to be interviewed, some officers notify authorities at the next
stop hoping that officers further down the line will approach these "refuseniks" again to
seek consent for a search). Moreover, evasive and unresponsive answers, when combined
with other factors, can even give rise to probable cause to arrest the person. See United
States v Tarango-Hinojos, 791 F2d 1174, 1176-77 (5th Cir 1986); Kirby, 510 F2d at 401.
Similarly, the refusal to consent to leave a bag behind at a train station for a search or
canine sniff, combined with a few points on the drug-courier profile, including "inappropriately vague answers to questions about [one's] destination," have been held to give rise to
the reasonable suspicion necessary to justify the seizure of both person and luggage. United
States v Nurse, 916 F2d 20, 24 (DC Cir 1990).
The withdrawal of consent may occasion similar hazards. See United States v Carter,
985 F2d 1095, 1098 (DC Cir 1993) (Wald dissenting).
48 See, for example, United States v Tavolacci, 895 F2d 1423, 1424-25 (DC Cir 1990);
United States v Winston, 892 F2d 112, 118 (DC Cir 1989).
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measures of suspicion or evidence. Hardly a week goes by when
there is not a story in the Washington Post or Washington Times
about someone detained for weeks who later had the charges
dropped or someone released when the corroboration never materialized for the arrest. 9 Conversely, the same newspapers carry
countless stories about outraged neighborhood associations complaining of the suspicious characters they report to the police who
are never arrested6" or who, once arrested, are released to the
streets rather than preventively detained. 1 In all of these situations, the criminal law determines whether society, to protect itself, is entitled to take some action despite the lack of compelling
proof-or proof beyond a reasonable doubt-that a suspect has actually done something wrong.
The press routinely writes about these decisions, which are not
so different from the decisions that society and the press make in
other arenas regarding whom to subject to the glare of adverse
publicity, entrust with governance, or give support, respect, or adulation. There is indeed a certain symmetry in the dire-response
correlation of law enforcement officers and journalists: No evidence? You can send up a trial balloon. A little evidence? You can
probe for a short time and on the surface. Probability but no certainty? You can take control. Likelihood of danger to the community? You can put the suspect away. In short, the press is just as
likely to take note of these far less stringent standards of proof as
it is to address the reasonable doubt standard for conviction, if indeed the press looks to the criminal law for guidance at all.
A comparison of the number of police-citizen encounters, investigative stops on less than probable cause, and even arrests on

,' See, for example, Veronica A. Holt, The Tom Barnes Case: Crime and Unjust Punishment, Wash Post C8 (Oct 25, 1992) (criticizing arrest and three-week detention of teenager on murder charge that was later dropped).
10 See, for example, Gabriel Escobar, Ex-Boyfriend Is Arrested in P.G. Slaying, Wash
Post B1 (Nov 30, 1992) (family of slain teenager questions why police did not arrest her
assailant two weeks earlier when the victim and her family complained to the police about
him).
51 See, for example, Graciela Sevilla and Michael York, D.C. Freed Suspect in Carjacking, Wash Post Al (Sept 10, 1992) (suspect in carjacking and murder had been released a
week earlier after his arrest on felony drug charges); Gabriel Escobar, James Gets Maximum Term in Anacostia Freeway Killing, Wash Post B1 (June 30, 1992) (teenager faced
three trials for killings committed in the month following his release from juvenile
detention).
Under the District of Columbia's new bail law, roughly four of five criminal defendants
brought before the District of Columbia Superior Court are released without bond within
two weeks of their arrest. Nancy Lewis, Bail Law's Results Mixed, Wash Post D1 (Sept 4,
1992).
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probable cause, to the number of jury trials in which doubt must
be proved beyond a reasonable doubt leads inevitably to the conclusion that the system overwhelmingly operates on a less-thanreasonable-doubt standard. In one recent year, for example,
ninety-five thousand people were arrested by federal authorities;
only about six thousand were acquitted or convicted by a jury applying the reasonable doubt standard.52 It is my firm belief that
the man and woman on the street, especially in the inner city,
along with their favorite reporters, have a healthy sense of all this.
B. Pretrial Criminal Process
This less-than-reasonable-doubt standard that operates in police-citizen encounters continues into the pretrial process of plea
bargaining, where the system accommodates alternative measurements for guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. In a system in which
only one to five of every one hundred accused persons go to trial, 3
the guilty plea is the mode by which the vast majority of the accused are convicted. 54 A defendant typically pleads guilty to one
crime or count of an indictment, thereby saving society the cost of
a trial and the uncertainty of conviction; in return, he gets other
"2United

States Department of Justice, Bureau of Justice Statistics, Sourcebook of

Criminal Justice Statistics-1991 492, 530 (1992) (year ending June 30, 1990) ("DOJ
Sourcebook").
'3 See United States Sentencing Commission, The Federal Sentencing Guidelines: A
Report on the Operation of the Guidelines System and Short-Term Impacts on Disparity
in Sentencing, Use of Incarceration,and ProsecutorialDiscretionand Plea Bargaining 397
(1991) (of 110,000 criminal matters initiated in federal courts in 1989, fewer than 6,000 defendants went to trial) ("1991 Report").
11 Over 85 percent of all federal defendants plead guilty. 1990 U.S. Sentencing Commission Annual Report 60 (citing statistics for year ending Sept 30, 1991). See DOJ
Sourcebook at 518 (cited in note 52) (Of 57,000 defendants in the federal court system in
the year ending June 30, 1990, over 40,000 pleaded guilty; fewer than 1,700 were tried by a
judge; just over 6,000 were tried by a jury; and roughly 8,000 had their charges dismissed.
This means that only about one in ten federal defendants were tried by a jury. Of the 48,000
defendants whose cases were not dismissed, 40,000, or 83 percent, pleaded guilty.). See also
1991 Report at 397 (cited in note 53) (of 45,000 federal criminal cases resolved in 1989,
39,000, or 87 percent, involved guilty pleas); United States Department of Justice, Bureau of
Justice Statistics, The Prevalence of Guilty Pleas 2 (1984) (analysis of guilty pleas based on
felony arrests in selected jurisdictions revealed that there were eleven guilty pleas for every
trial).
The percentage of guilty pleas is even higher in state courts. Of the roughly 667,000
defendants convicted of felonies in state courts in 1988, 91 percent pleaded guilty, while 4
percent were tried by a judge, and 5 percent by a jury. United States Department of Justice,
Bureau of Justice Statistics, Felony Sentences in State Courts, 1988 6 (1990). The number
is undoubtedly higher for misdemeanors or other crimes for which the cost to the defendant
of pleading guilty might be less than the cost of going to trial.
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counts dropped and/or the government's cooperation in his request
for a lenient sentence.
Rule 11 of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure requires
that, before accepting a plea, the judge must inform the defendant
of the consequences and ensure that he fully understands to what
he is pleading and that he is not acting under threats or promises
(apart from the plea agreement itself).5 5 But under existing law,
the defendant need not admit his guilt;" he may knowingly plead
guilty for other reasons, for example, because he thinks he will be
convicted anyway with a longer sentence or to save his family or
his companions pain. It is common knowledge that guilty pleas are
often carefully crafted bargains to give both sides something; they
57
have little to do with proof of guilt beyond a reasonable doubt.
This is assumed to be true especially in high visibility cases
involving official malfeasance. When a highly placed defendant is
allowed to plead to a lesser offense and turn state's evidence for
the prosecution in return for having the heaviest counts against
him dropped, most newspaper writers or readers know the score.
When Ivan Boesky was sentenced, for example, the judge remarked that his "offense cannot go unpunished. Its scope was too
great, its influence too profound, its seriousness too substantial
merely to forgive and forget."" Yet, Boesky pled guilty to only one
count of conspiring to file false stock reports; he received a threeyear sentence, and agreed to give evidence against over a dozen
other Wall Street insiders and brokerage firms." Similarly, Allen
Fiers, formerly the head of the Central Intelligence Agency's
("CIA") Central American Task Force, pled guilty to two misdemeanor charges of withholding information from Congress, receiving only probation and one hundred hours of community service.
In testifying at the trial of his boss, however, Fiers acknowledged
that in fact he had committed much more serious violations by go-

" FRCrP 11.
" North Carolina v Alford, 400 US 25, 37 (1970).
N In a compelling, if somewhat dated, study, Michael Finkelstein concluded that more
than two-thirds of the marginal guilty plea defendants would not have been convicted had
they contested their cases. Michael 0. Finkelstein, A Statistical Analysis of Guilty Plea
Practicesin the Federal Courts, 89 Harv L Rev 293, 299 (1975). A growing number of scholars view plea bargaining as just that: a "bargain" related to the proof of the crime largely by
both parties' inclusion in their calculations of the likelihood that the evidence will lead to a
conviction. See, for example, Frank H. Easterbrook, Criminal Procedure as a Market System, 12 J Legal Stud 289 (1983).
" David A. Vise and Steve Coll, Ivan Boesky Sentenced to Three Years in Prison,
Wash Post Al (Dec 19, 1987).
5 Id.
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ing ahead with covert operations after Congress ordered him not to
do so.e°
In some cases, individual suspects may not even be formally
accused or asked to plead guilty if their corporate employer takes
the blame. For example, the Washington Post reported recently
that although Rockwell International paid $18.5 million in fines
and pled guilty to federal environmental violations at the Rocky
Flats Nuclear Facility, none of its executives or employees were
indicted, despite the reported strong sentiment among grand jurors
to pursue the individuals." "He got off easy," or "he copped a
plea" sums up the public and the press reaction to many such
cases, and indeed it is often the reality.
C.

Criminal Jury Trials

What of the few cases that actually go on to a jury trial? Jury
verdicts must, in theory, be based on proof beyond a reasonable
doubt. Recent events suggest, however, that many factors other
than proof affect the outcome. Juries are widely perceived as acting more like some kind of amorphous community conscience than
as strict constructionists of the "beyond-a-reasonable-doubt" standard. Indeed, the press fosters this perception through its relentless pursuit of post-verdict stories into why jurors acted as they
did. A rash of stories in the Washington, D.C. press recently produced numerous revelations of jurors who told their colleagues that
they simply would not send another young black male to jail, no
matter what the evidence showed. 2 Other stories demonstrate how
jurors compromise differences about the strength of the evidence
among themselves by finding the defendant guilty on some but not
George Lardner, Jr., Fiers Sentenced to Probation in Iran-ContraCoverup, Wash
Post A9 (Feb 1, 1992); Walter Pincus and George Lardner, Jr., Covert CIA Operation Via
Church Outlined, Wash Post A4 (Aug 1, 1992). Fiers and five other officials, including former Defense Secretary Caspar W. Weinberger, were granted Christmas Eve pardons by
President Bush. Walter Pincus, Bush Pardons Weinberger in Iran-Contra Affair, Wash
Post Al (Dec 25, 1992).
"' See Thomas W. Lippman, Justice Dept. Defends Plea Bargain in Rocky Flats Case,
00

Wash Post A3 (Oct 1, 1992). This sentiment may have been shared by a House subcommittee, which has subpoenaed the prosecutors and Justice Department officials as part of its
investigation into the plea arrangement. See id; Thomas W. Lippman, Memo Says Plutonium Is Not in Safe Storage, Wash Post A3 (Oct 8, 1992). See also Sharon LaFraniere, The
Grand Jury That Couldn't, Wash Post Al (Nov 10, 1992).
62 See, for example, Barton Gellman and Sari Horwitz, Letter Stirs Debate After Acquittal,Wash Post Al (Apr 22, 1990); Nancy Lewis, D.C. Man Acquitted by Racial Sympathy Guilty in 2nd Murder, Wash Post B3 (July 27, 1991); Charlotte Williams, The New Jim
Crow, Wash Post C8 (Sept 22, 1991). See also Martin Gottlieb, "Beyond a Reasonable
Doubt" Often Puts a Jury on Trial, NY Times D6 (Nov 22, 1992).
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all counts, again regardless of what the evidence showed. 3 The
D.C. Circuit had a case recently in which a juror reported that the
sympathetic jury had considered letting a defendant out of a fiveyear mandatory minimum penalty that kicked in with possession
of five grams of crack by preparing to find her guilty of possessing
some, but not all, of the 5.25 grams of rock cocaine that were found
in her pocketbook, although the evidence was the same as to each
rock."'
Judges' instructions do not do much to illuminate the reasonable doubt standard. A reporter who conducted interviews with the
Imelda Marcos jurors found that they completely failed to understand the instructions on the RICO count, and simply ignored that
charge altogether. He described their reaction: "Jury instructions
are like foreign movies without subtitles.

'65

My first boss, Jerry

Frank, wrote in 1950 that "were the full truth declared [as to what
goes on in the jury room] it is doubtful whether more than one
percent of verdicts could stand. ' ' 6 I think that is just as true to-

day. Granted, the jury system is good overall and a worthwhile microcosm for deciding blameworthiness. But few judges-or reporters-believe that every jury slavishly and precisely follows the
beyond-a-reasonable-doubt standard in deciding guilt or innocence. 6 7 Because members of the press have worked so assiduously
to deflate the myth of a norm-conforming jury, it is reasonable to
assume that the press likewise does not consider the beyond-areasonable-doubt standard in their own profession.
In fairness, it is hard to criticize jurors for not following the
reasonable doubt standard religiously, given that after two hundred years, the courts themselves are still not sure what it means.
Although the Supreme Court held that the reasonable doubt standard was "indispensable to command the respect and confidence of
the community in applications of the criminal law,"6 8 and "provide[s] concrete substance for the presumption of innocence, "69 the
"' See Newton

N. Minow and Fred H. Cate, Who Is An Impartial Juror in an Age of

Mass Media?, 40 Am U L Rev 631, 659 (1991).
o Brief for Appellant at 6, 8 and Exhibit A, United States v Wheeler, Crim No 91-3175

(DC Cir, Nov 10, 1992) (Affidavit of Lois R. Goodman, Counsel for Appellant).

" Symposium

Generates Ideas for Jury Communication, 6 Criminal Practice Manual

(BNA) 207, 208 (Apr 29, 1992) (quoting Stephen Adler).

*' United States v Farina, 184 F2d 18, 21 (2d Cir 1950) (Frank dissenting).
67 See In re Winship, 397 US 358, 369-70 (1970) (Harlan concurring) (vagueness of

terms and impossibility of measuring intensity of human belief suggest that "beyond a reasonable doubt" and "preponderance" are not applied with precision).
8

Id at 364.

Id at 363.
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same Court is still engaged in trying to articulate what reasonable
doubt means. Just within the last few years, the Court had to chastise a Louisiana court for telling the jury that reasonable doubt
meant "grave uncertainty," "actual substantial doubt," or "moral
certainty. 7' The Supreme Court said that the state court imposed
a higher degree of doubt than was required, but failed to give a
better-and certainly not a mathematical -formula. 1
In many courts, lawyers still fight over whether it is acceptable
to say reasonable doubt means "a doubt for which you can give a
reason."7 2 Opponents argue, not implausibly, that in other areas of
life people make significant decisions for reasons they cannot articulate. 3 In any case, jurors or judges may know a reasonable doubt
when they see it, but they cannot define it very well, which further
depreciates the reasonable doubt standard's value as a model in
other walks of life.
D.

Criminal Sentencing

Finally, the prize exhibit of the criminal justice system's lack
of dedication to the reasonable doubt standard occurs at sentencing through the application of the Federal Sentencing Guidelines.
These guidelines provide that a convicted offender's sentence be
based not only on the offense for which he was convicted by a reasonable doubt or even his past criminal record of similar convictions, but also on other "relevant conduct" ' of which he has not
been convicted or often not even charged, and of which he may
have been acquitted. 5 This startling guideline norm, which not
only permits but commands this result, has been upheld by the
71

Cage v Louisiana, 498 US 39 (1990).

71

Id.

See, for example, Adams v Aiken, 965 F2d 1306, 1310 (4th Cir 1992); United States v
MacDonald, 455 F2d 1259, 1262-63 (1st Cir 1972).
73 See United States v Vest, 639 F Supp 899, 904 (D Mass 1986), aff'd, 813 F2d 477 (lst
Cir 1987) (finding it "characteristic of human experience that individuals usually-perhaps
even always-act with mixed motives"). See also Farina,184 F2d at 23-24 (Frank dissenting) (even a judge or an administrative decisionmaker may find it difficult to give an explicit
reason for conclusion).
71 United States Sentencing Commission, Guidelines Manual § 1B1.3 (Nov 1992)
("Guidelines"). This is consistent with the distinction throughout the Guidelines between
"relevant conduct on the one hand, and the offense of conviction on the other." United
States v Williams, 891 F2d 921, 925 (DC Cir 1989) (emphasis in original).
75 See United States v Isom, 886 F2d 736, 738-39 (4th Cir 1989) (because acquittal
demonstrates only lack of proof beyond a reasonable doubt, it does not necessarily establish
a defendant's innocence). Compare United States v Castro-Cervantes,927 F2d 1079, 1082
(9th Cir 1990) (sentencing court may not consider charges against the defendant that were
dropped pursuant to a plea agreement).
71
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overwhelming majority7 6 of circuits that have considered constitutional challenges to it.

To understand the significance of this guideline, consider a defendant indicted for two drug sales, one weighing one gram and
one weighing five grams, both of which were part of one ongoing
operation or, as the Guidelines put it, "the same course of conduct
or common scheme or plan.

' 77

Suppose the jury finds him guilty of

the first and not guilty of the second, more serious charge. He will
still be sentenced on the basis of both crimes-and given as much
as five additional years in prison-if the judge (not the jury) finds
by a preponderance of the evidence 78 that he committed the second offense as well as the first, despite the jury verdict that he did
not.7 9' There has been a fair amount of national publicity given to
"' United States v Boney, 977 F2d 624, 636-37 (DC Cir 1992); United States v Averi,
922 F2d 765, 766 (11th Cir 1991); United States v Rodriguez-Gonzales, 899 F2d 177, 182
(2d Cir 1990); United States v Dawn, 897 F2d 1444, 1449-50 (8th Cir 1990); United States v
Wilson, 900 F2d 1350, 1353-55 (9th Cir 1990); United States v Frederick,897 F2d 490, 49293 (10th Cir 1990); United States v McDowell, 888 F2d 285, 290-91 (3d Cir 1989); United
States v Wright, 873 F2d 437, 441-42 (1st Cir 1989); United States v Urrego-Linares,879
F2d 1234, 1237-38 (4th Cir 1989).
11 Guidelines at § 1B1.3(a) (cited in note 74). The most recent revision of this guideline, which became effective November 1, 1992, clarified that a finding of a "common
scheme or plan" could be based on commonality of victims, commonality of offenders, commonality of purpose, or similarity of modus operandi. Id at Application Note 9(A). Even
offenses that are not part of such a common scheme can be considered part of the "same
course of conduct" based on the degree of similarity of the offenses, the time interval between the offenses, and the nature of the offenses. Id at Application Note 9(B). For example, failure to file income tax returns in three consecutive years would be considered part of
the same course of conduct. Id. For a summary of the changes to this section, see United
States Sentencing Commission, Guidelines Appendix C at 256-64.
" This use of the preponderance standard in guidelines cases has been upheld in the
overwhelming majority of circuits. See, for example, McDowell, 888 F2d at 290-91; UrregoLinares, 879 F2d at 1237-38; Wright, 873 F2d at 441-42; United States v Restrepo, 946 F2d
654 (9th Cir 1991), cert denied, 112 S Ct 1564 (1992); United States v Guerra, 888 F2d 247,
251 (2d Cir 1989); United States v Casto, 889 F2d 562, 570 (5th Cir 1989); United States v
Gooden, 892 F2d 725, 727-28 (8th Cir 1989); United States v Kirk, 894 F2d 1162, 1164 (10th
Cir 1990); United States v Alston, 895 F2d 1362, 1372-73 (11th Cir 1990); United States v
Chandler, 894 F2d 463 (DC Cir 1990); United States v Barrett, 890 F2d 855, 869 (6th Cir
1989); United States v White, 888 F2d 490, 499 (7th Cir 1989). See also McMillan v Pennsylvania, 477 US 79, 91-92 (1986) (Constitution permits a state court to apply a lesser standard than reasonable doubt in determining facts at sentencing). But see United States v
Kikumura, 918 F2d 1084, 1099-1102 (3d Cir 1990) (clear and convincing standard necessary
to support upward departure of great magnitude); United States v Fatico, 458 F Supp 388,
408 (E D NY 1978), afOrd, 603 F2d 1053 (2d Cir 1979) (opinion of Weinstein) (clear and
convincing evidence required for factual issues that will have major impact on sentence).
"' This hypothetical became reality for one first-time defendant in the United States
District Court for the District of Columbia. Judicial Discretion in Sentencing Sparks Debate, Chicago Trib 24C (Dec 29, 1991) (jury convicted accused cocaine dealer of selling 1.44
grams of crack and acquitted him of selling 5.63 grams of crack; judge sentenced him on the
basis of both offenses).
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this guideline; 8 for some of us, it puts the final kibosh on any notion that guilt beyond a reasonable doubt is the hallmark of our
criminal justice system. Not only is that standard confined to the
fewer than 5 percent of defendants who go to trial, but even as to
them it becomes totally irrelevant in a multiple-count indictment
when the defendant is found guilty of any one of several related
counts.
E. Evidence
Before I leave this part of my critique, let me mention another
of Professor Schauer's suggested differences between the criminal
justice system and other decisionmaking that I do not believe
holds up under scrutiny. Professor Schauer suggests that the socalled aggregation of "multiple low-probability conclusions" may
justify an inference of wrongdoing in out-of-court settings but
would be impermissible in the criminal trial setting. 1 Not so. We
call it "circumstantial evidence," but it is basically the same thing.
Aggregation of lots of facts, each individually innocent or of low
probability, provides the proof of guilt in most non-eyewitness
criminal cases. Proof of "a little bit about a lot of things" often
adds up to a verdict of guilt beyond a reasonable doubt.
For example, constructive possession of drugs, which is defined as having the ability to exercise "dominion and control" over
the drugs even though they are not on one's physical person, comes
up most often in a raid on a crack house where many persons are
present and none admits they personally possessed the drugs. In
such cases, prosecutors and courts depend upon a series of low
probability factors that in isolation would not warrant a finding of
possession but that, in the aggregate, may. Evidence of physical
proximity to the drugs (the person and the drugs were in the same
room), any gestures implying control (such as pointing to the place
where the drugs were hidden), connection to a gun (with the inference that the gun was to protect the drugs), evasive action (trying
to escape or hide the drugs), or even motive (she needed the
money to feed her kids), can add up to a permissible finding of
constructive possession. 2 Aggregation of small, often low
80

See, for example, Steven M. Salky and Blair G. Brown, The Preponderanceof Evi-

dence Standard at Sentencing, 29 Am Crim L Rev 907 (1992); Donna Halvorsen, Judges
Speak Out Against U.S. Sentencing Guidelines, Star Trib 4A (Oct 7, 1992).
" Schauer, 1993 U Chi Legal F at 92 (cited in note 1).
62 See, for example, United States v Morris, 977 F2d 617, 620 (DC Cir 1992).
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probability facts, none of which is guilt-conclusive, is the name of
the game.
A second example of the criminal law's reliance on the aggregation of low probability factors is the admission against a defendant of so-called "other crimes" evidence. This doctrine has long
put defendants between a rock and a hard place. The formal baseline in the Federal Rules of Evidence is that evidence of other
crimes, even convictions, cannot be admitted to show that the defendant was the kind of person who would commit the crime at
issue. 3 While such an inference may make sense in common logic,
it is considered too prejudicial to be allowed as a general proposition. The Rules of Evidence, however, have carved out a giant exception that allows such evidence to be admitted even when the
prior bad conduct has not resulted in arrest or conviction. Rule
404(b) provides that evidence of other crimes, wrongs, or acts is
admissible to show proof of motive, opportunity, intent, preparation, plan, knowledge, identity, or absence of mistake (provided
that the judge rules under Rule 403 that it is more probative than
prejudicial). According to the Comment on Rule 404(b), it has
emerged as one of the most cited rules in the Rules of Evidence.8 4
You bet it has. It is almost routine in drug trafficking cases to include evidence of prior or subsequent sales or operations in which
the defendant participated (even if never charged) in order to show
the defendant's intent or knowledge of the instant drug operation.8 5 That kind of evidence must be influential to the jury, and
there is no requirement that the occurrence of those other crimes
be proved beyond a reasonable doubt.
Our civil law is similarly laced with instances in which evidence of past violations, never proven as such, can be admitted to
show "pattern and practice," that is, that the past violation is part
of an ongoing pattern.8 6 If Brock Adams, Bob Packwood, or Clar-

FRE 404(b).
FRE 404(b) Advisory Committee's Note on the 1991 Amendment.
B See, for example, United States v Allen, 960 F2d 1055, 1058 (DC Cir 1992) (per
curiam), cert denied, 113 S Ct 231 (1992) (evidence of other crimes relevant to determination of intent and knowledge); United States v Watson, 894 F2d 1345, 1349 (DC Cir 1990)
(evidence of later incident relevant to determination of intent and knowledge); United
States v Manner, 887 F2d 317, 321 (DC Cir 1989) (evidence of later drug sale relevant to
determination of intent).
" For example, a Title VII plaintiff can support a disparate treatment claim by showing a pattern and practice of discrimination, Palmer v Shultz, 815 F2d 84, 96 (DC Cir 1987),
and a civil rights plaintiff can sue a law enforcement officer's superiors only upon a showing
of a "pattern or practice" of police misconduct. Martin v Malhoyt, 830 F2d 237, 255 (DC
Cir 1987). See also Barry v United States, 865 F2d 1317, 1325 (DC Cir 1989) (inquiring
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ence Thomas 87 had been tried in court, evidence of past conduct
similar to that alleged in the press might well have been
admissible.
Where does all of this take us on Professor Schauer's thesis?
To me it says that, in the final analysis, the criminal justice system
is not very different from other social systems in which important
communal decisions must be made. Measured responses are allowed along a spectrum. Some coercion, inconvenience, and even
stigma are warranted on a relatively low level of evidence of guilt.
Sustained incarceration and grievous stigma require (at least in
theory) an extremely high level of proof. In practice, of course, everyone realizes that the system does not always work this way; people can bargain their way out of overwhelming evidence of guilt if
there is an accepted social value for their forgiveness, such as the
continued survival of an overloaded court system or the valuable
information they can offer to convict a "bigger fish." And after
conviction, when the severity of punishment is determined, the
decisionmaker is required to abandon the reasonable doubt standard altogether and punish on the basis of "relevant conduct"
identified by the prosecutor for which the judge finds there is a
preponderance of evidence-even if the jury has already found
there is reasonable doubt about some or all of it.
The people inside the system-judges, lawyers, police-know
all this; so does the press. I am not sure, then, why the reasonable
doubt standard-familiar as it may be, courtesy of television and
movies-is likely to infect or even inhibit reporters' decisions
about when to expose, criticize, or condemn public figures. I would
surmise the opposite: The press, recognizing the variety of coercive
responses to far lesser levels of proof, would be encouraged in its
efforts to bring probative evidence of wrongdoing to the public.
whether there was a "pattern or practice" of impermissible disclosures of grand jury materials that would justify civil contempt sanctions or injunctive relief); Giacobbi v Biermann,
780 F Supp 33, 40 (D DC 1992), aff'd, 1992 US App LEXIS 31343 (DC Cir) (pattern and
practice of failing to meet statutory obligations can overcome presumption of nonreviewability of agency enforcement actions); Thorne v Alexander, 1992 US Dist LEXIS 1768 (D
DC) (discussing pattern and practice claim under the Age Discrimination in Employment
Act); Huskey v Quinlan, 785 F Supp 4 (D DC 1992) (pattern and practice claim under 42
USC § 1985, which outlaws racial discrimination).
0' See Howard Kurtz, Questions of Privacy: Is There Anyplace Left Where the Media
Fear to Tread?, Wash Post D1 (Apr 23, 1992) (allegations of sexual harassment ended Adams's Senate career); Eric Pianin, Senate Inquiry on Packwood Signals Sea Change in Attitude, Wash Post Al (Dec 7, 1992) (referring to alleged sexual misconduct of the three
public figures).
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A NORM GIVES WAY
THE SCANT EVIDENCE OF JOURNALIST RELIANCE ON CRIMINAL
LAW NORMS

On an empirical note, I see little evidence that journalists look
to the criminal law for guidance. Accordingly, I question how the
reasonable doubt norm could inhibit reporters in any significant
way. As Professor Schauer recognizes, journalists and investigative
reporters have their own norms and ethics and, in the case of the
Washington Post, even their own ombudsman.
Not long ago, the press featured extensive discussions about
the ethics of publishing the name of the alleged rape victim in the
Kennedy Smith imbroglio88 and about how much coverage to give
either Gennifer Flowers or Jennifer Fitzgerald in the presidential
campaigns.8 None of these discussions focused on legal concepts.
Insofar as journalists look to legal norms, I would suppose the libel
laws rather than the criminal laws most concern them. Indeed,
most major papers have their own lawyers "vet" controversial
copy.90 While the standard is high, there are still some libel verdicts upheld, and journalists and their publishers worry about
them. In September, a state trial judge in Pennsylvania affirmed a
$34 million verdict, the second highest ever, against the Philadelphia Inquirer for suggesting that a prosecutor crushed a murder
investigation as a favor to a friend. 1
In all, my impression is that with major public figures, journalists are willing to go to the edge. For instance, recently newspapers
were full of tidbits about former President Reagan's alleged past
involvement in the Iran-Contra affair in spite of the unlikelihood
See, for example, William Glaberson, Times Article Naming Rape Accuser Ignites
Debate on Journalistic Values, NY Times Al (Apr 26, 1991); Howard Kurtz, The Palm
Beach Blame Game, Wash Post C1 (May 11, 1991); Jonathon Kwitny, PublicInterest, Public Naming, NY Times A23 (May 8, 1991).
89 See, for example, Joann Byrd, Wince and Publish, Wash Post C6 (Aug 16, 1992)
(saying the Washington Post was "obligated" to report accusations about President Bush's
affair with Jennifer Fitzgerald); E.J. Dionne, Jr., GOP Accuses Media of Bias Against Bush,
Wash Post Al (Aug 13, 1992) (Vice President Quayle criticized journalists for purveying
"sleaze"); Howard Kurtz, Who What When Where Why Be Objective? Politics, and the
Times, Wash Post F1 (Nov 15, 1992); Kurtz, Wash Post at D1 (cited at note 87); George
Will, Privacy and the Predators,Wash Post A21 (Aug 15, 1991).
" For public figures, actual malice or "reckless disregard" is the settled legal standard
for libel, and a high one it is. New York Times Co. v Sullivan, 376 US 254 (1964). A few
years ago, in Hustler v Falwell, 485 US 46 (1988), the Supreme Court declined to countenance a way around that high standard by refusing to permit a public figure to sue a magazine for the state-law tort of emotional distress. The Court found that "in the world of
debate about public affairs, many things done with motives that are less than admirable are
protected by the First Amendment." 485 US at 53.
9 Judge Refuses to Overturn Libel Award, Wash Post A18 (Sept 11, 1992).
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of successfully prosecuting him based on what we know, and assuming that we could constitutionally indict and try the ex-President for conduct in office.92 Similarly, a myriad of public figures
have been identified, or at least speculated about, in relation to the
so-called "October Surprise" of 1980 (the alleged deal between Republican campaigners and the Iranian government to postpone the
release of the hostages until after Reagan took office), despite the
fact that so far no one has found a smoking gun that would support an indictment of any of them. s
But-Professor Schauer asks-do journalists react differently
when their story threatens to take something away from a public
figure? In my experience, when a Supreme Court (or even a lower
court) nominee's name first becomes public, there is often a rash of
negative stories, many trial balloons. In the Thomas case, for instance, reports of possible wife mistreatment, conflicts of interest,
EEOC maladministration, and involvement in pornography appeared-in the best as well as the worst of newspapers."' Most of
those stories had no follow-up after a vigorous response and no additional corroboration. A few charges, however, lingered into and
beyond the confirmation hearings. Yet once the confirmation fight
was over, what coverage remained focused on the issues of sexual
harassment and the related area of pornography, and, of course, on
the possible perjury committed during the hearings. It is not clear,
however, that this decrease in publicity reflects any ethical reluctance to attack an incumbent; more likely, the' press coverage diminished because no one was interested in rehashing old evidence.
If something new did explode on the scene, however, it would be a
bigger story-and a more deserving one-because of the very incumbency and power of the subject.
91A president currently in office enjoys certain immunity from prosecution. See United
States v Nixon, 418 US 683 (1974).
93 See Gary Sick, October Surprise: America's Hostages in Iran and the Election of
Ronald Reagan (Times Books, 1991); Robert Parry, The Looking-Glass "Surprise," Wash
Post C1 (Dec 6, 1992); October Surprise: Not Proven, NY Times A20 (Nov 25, 1992); David
Johnston, '80 Hostage Dealings by G.O.P. Verged on Impropriety, Panel Says, NY Times
All (Nov 24, 1992).
9 See, for example, Ethan Bronner, Thomas Role at EEOC Lightning Rod for Controversy, Boston Globe 12 (July 2, 1991) (recounting criticism of Thomas's leadership of
EEOC); Jim Dwyer, Lies Litter Path to Confirmation, Newsday 4 (Oct 16, 1991) (recounting speculation about Thomas's first marriage or possible drug abuse); Juan Williams,
Smearing Thomas, Atlanta J and Const All (Oct 14, 1991) (decrying "blood-in-the-water
response from reputable news operations" to stories of expense account abuse at EEOC,
spouse abuse, and criticism of civil rights leaders); Michael Wines, Stark Conflict Marks
Accounts Given by Thomas and Professor, NY Times B14 (Oct 10, 1991) (reporting on a
witness's accounts of Thomas's interest in pornography).
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Professor Schauer may be right that in the ordinary reader's
mind, there is something less odious about denying someone a coveted place in public life than forcing someone to resign from public
office, and the reader may want more solid evidence in the latter
case. This notion of entitlements and vested interests with their
accompanying procedures and burdens of proof needed before
withdrawal has solid roots in our civil law; it is called due process.
Someone may have a property or a liberty interest in not losing her
job that she does not have in being hired in the first place. Our
whole Civil Service Reform Act, which governs the law of adverse
actions against federal employees, is built on that premise. 5 In
their own way, then, journalists and their readers may feel an instinctive need to follow some line of demarcation between what is
fair game in going after a contender and in going after an incumbent (elections are, of course, an exception). People may be more
interested in the wrongdoings of those in power than in those seeking it, and expect abuse to be documented on a higher level. The
old saying that if "you shoot for the king, you had better not miss"
seems to resonate with the public and may make reporters less
comfortable taking potshots at incumbents than at challengers.
But this dividing line-if it exists-is by no means decisive. One
can debate interminably whether the press went easier during the
1992 presidential campaign on Bush than Clinton (probably no) or
harder during the 1988 campaign on Dukakis than Bush (probably
yes). The stench of Watergate permeated former President Nixon's
last years; incumbency did him little good. In the final analysis,
reporters should and do go for a story that plays out-whether or
not its object is an incumbent and has any vested interest to lose.
I do have one counterpoint, however, that may come from living in Washington for most of my life. David Broder identified as a
new beast "[a] hybrid creature, an androgynous binding of politician and journalist called the Washington Insider." 96 Those in
power have the most news to give, and the temptation to be "in-

"
Civil Service Reform Act of 1978, Pub L No 95-454, 92 Stat 1111 (1978), codified as
amended in Titles 5, 10, 15, 28, 31, 39, and 42 of the United States Code. There is, or was,
one notorious exception to this distinction between gaining and retaining employment. A
few years ago, in interpreting an 1866 civil rights law, the Supreme Court in Patterson v
McLean Credit Union, 491 US 164, 176-77 (1989), held that it was a federal offense not to
enter into an employment relationship with someone on race-discriminatory grounds, but
the same did not apply to terminating the employment relationship on race-discriminatory
grounds. That restrictive reading has since been overruled by the Civil Rights Act of 1991,
Pub L No. 102-166, 105 Stat 1071 (1991), codified at 42 USC § 1981(b) (1991).
96 Adam Platt, Sound and Fury, NY Times Gl1 (Oct 4, 1992).
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side the loop" can corrupt the journalistic temperament. Feeling
the same way, I.F. Stone admirably refused to join press insiders."
Nevertheless, no reporter covets the "You'll never lunch in this
town again" or "Your calls will no longer be answered" award of
the week. Power wielders woo the press with deep background
leaks, scoops, and in-depth interviews. To the extent that some
kind of personal relationship is necessary to develop knowledgeable stories, that kind of intimacy may be inevitable and perhaps,
on balance, even healthy. But some manipulation of the press
plays on sheer vanity. People who want to lunch with movers and
shakers can be cowed by even the most subtle threats of ostracism.
This kind of "we happy few" identification by the press with the
power elite can make for a much greater reluctance to toll the bell
on someone in power than on someone scrapping for it. So, on balance, there may be some greater inhibition to attack one in power
than one seeking it, but if so, it is based more on a pragmatic than
a normative sense; that is, the consequences of an error on the reporter's own credibility are greater. Once the reporter gets on the
track of a solid story, though, the incentive to plug away is apt to
be greater-deservedly so-if it involves someone in power with
something to lose.
III. THE INFLUENCE OF THE PRESS ON PENDING TRIALS
Professor Schauer poses yet a third query: Does the pendency
of an actual criminal trial accentuate the pressure on reporters to
abandon stories that they might otherwise write because those stories risk biasing potential jurors and a fair trial for the public figure involved? I conclude again that reporters should not and, in
most cases, do not pull their punches. The much-publicized prosecutions of former Washington, D.C. mayor Marion Barry and the
attackers of Rodney King, as well as more generalized social science research, suggest that the dangers of press-manipulated trials
have been overemphasized. The videotape of Barry smoking crack
played interminably on all of the local television stations but did
not result in his conviction on that charge; the controversial Rodney King tape also did not prevent an acquittal of the police officers. Thus, jurors on the whole have turned out to be fairly independent-and cagey. 8
07 See Jonathan Kirsch, "Izzy" Chronicles an Icon of Journalism, LA Times E4 (Dec
23, 1992) (reviewing Robert C. Cottrell, Izzy: A Biography of I. F. Stone (Rutgers University Press, 1992)).
98See Minow & Cate, 40 Am U L Rev at 659 n 181 (cited in note 63).
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The justice system, however, tends to operate on a different,
and perhaps counterproductive, theory-that it must weed out not
just biased jurors, but all jurors exposed to prior publicity about
the case. A century ago, Mark Twain said, "We have a criminal
jury system which is superior to any other in the world; and its
efficiency is only marred by the difficulty of finding twelve every
day men who don't know anything and can't read."99 A more recent commentator, referring to the mass disqualification in the Oliver North trial of jurors who had watched the televised Senate
hearings, said "[t]he minuscule remainder eligible for jury service
have either been understudies of Rip Van Winkle or congenitally
somnolent in the world of government."100
Because judges can control-to some degree-statements
made by the prosecutors and defense attorneys, but not, of course,
by the press, our criminal justice system has evolved several techniques to control the damage from the assaults on community
readers by an overzealous press. These techniques, which no one
will claim are foolproof, include a change of venue where an entire
community has been saturated with prejudicial publicity, a continuance until the turmoil dies down, and voir dire to weed out biased
jurors. Finally, despite research suggesting that many, if not most,
jury instructions are either misunderstood or ignored, the system
relies on instructions to the jury not to consider any out-of-court
evidence. 101
Jury bias can be a real danger. Studies show that in the case of
an initially biased juror, jury deliberations are likely to exaggerate
rather than diffuse that bias because the genuinely biased juror filters all evidence through his biased lens. 102 The problem, however,
is that current in-court controls too often emphasize exposure, not
bias. In the Barry trial, for instance, prospective jurors were required to fill out a 22-page questionnaire on every newspaper or
television program they had seen over the previous six months.'03
" Mark Twain, Sketches, New and Old 235 (American Publishing Co., 1st ed 1875),
cited in Minow & Cate, 40 Am U L Rev at 632 (cited in note 63).
100 Bruce Fein, Face-Off: Picking the Oliver North Jury, USA Today 8A (Feb 9, 1989).
101 See Minow & Cate, 40 Am U L Rev at 648-49 nn 105-09 (cited in note 63). Judge
Learned Hand dismissed jury instructions as a "placebo," United States v Delli Paoli, 229
F2d 319, 321 (2d Cir 1956), aft'd, 352 US 232 (1957), that required "a mental gymnastic
which is beyond, not only [the jurors'] powers, but anybody's else." Nash v United States,
54 F2d 1006, 1007 (2d Cir 1932).
10. See Minow & Cate, 40 Am U L Rev at 649 (cited in note 63).
"I See id at 663, citing United States v Barry, 1990 US Dist LEXIS (D DC) (prospec-
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Some commentators on the jury system think the desirable
goal is a representativejury, not one that has been selected to assure no prior knowledge of the case. 10 Thus, instead of trying to
screen out knowledgeable jurors who read newspapers and listen to
television, we should try to include them in the mix and focus our
energy on developing techniques to identify potential jurors who
have already made up their minds beyond conversion by evidence.
This of course would be a "Back to the Future" move; a return to
the original concept of the jury as knowledgeable but unbiased
community evaluators. 0 6 But the alternative in our informationexplosive age may be "extensive voir dire and challenges -permitting attorneys to de-select their way to a panel less representative
of the community-[which] may prove a far greater threat to the
fundamental fairness of the verdict than exposure to any media
coverage."' 1 6 Especially in trials that involve public figures and
government malfeasance, we need smart and informed jurors who
know how to process information and are used to reading and
screening what they read. If that is the direction in which we ought
to be moving, the best thing reporters can do for the system is to
print whatever well-documented information they can get their
hands on, regardless of whom it favors, and not to try to act, as
Professor Schauer suggests they should, as a surrogate judge or defense counsel.
It goes without saying, of course, that even a criminal conviction does not mean the end of a political career. The voters decide
that. Perhaps we overestimate the delegitimization function of the
criminal justice system; far from being stigmatic, criminal convictions and similar travails are seen by some citizens as legitimizing.
Marion Barry, having served six months, now occupies a seat on
the D.C. City Council;10 7 Oliver North is reportedly contemplating
running for the United States Senate; 0 8 Alcee Hastings, acquitted
by the criminal justice system, but impeached and found guilty by
Congress, has been elected to the same institution that impeached
104

See, for example, id; Hans Zeisel and Shari Seidman Diamond, The Effect of Pe-

remptory Challenges on Jury and Verdict: An Experiment in a FederalDistrict Court, 30
Stan L Rev 491, 531 (1978); Selecting ImpartialJuries: Must Ignorance Be a Virtue in Our
Search for Justice?, Panel Two: Current JudicialPractice,Legal Issues and Existing Remedies, 40 Am U L Rev 573 (1991).
10' See Valerie P. Hans and Neil Vidmar, Judging the Jury 23-24 (Plenum Press,
1986); Lloyd E. Moore, The Jury: Tool of Kings, Palladium of Liberty 39 (W.H. Anderson,
1973).
"' Minow & Cate, 40 Am U L Rev at 660 (cited in note 63).
107 Ward 8 Has to Believe in Second Chances, Wash Post C8 (Nov 22, 1992).
10I See Doyle McManus, Ollie North, Semper Fi, LA Times El (Oct 24, 1991).
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him. 10 9 And much of Hastings's voter appeal, according to the
newspapers, is that he has been beaten up by "the system." As one
Hastings supporter said, "It shows character. All the hits he took,
and he's not running with his tail 'between his legs." 110
Although I believe that the effect of the media on jurors is
exaggerated, at least one panel of the D.C. Circuit has deemed its
effect on witnesses to be substantial, even insurmountable. I refer
to the Oliver North case in which the D.C. Circuit laid down stringent standards for showing that no grand jury or trial witness
against North was affected in any way by viewing North's immunized testimony at the earlier televised Senate hearings on the
Iran-Contra affair."' On remand, the Independent Counsel dismissed the case because of the impossibility of meeting those standards. 1 2 Whether the decision was right or wrong (I dissented and
the Supreme Court denied certiorari), it represented, in my view, a
quantum leap from prior decisions on the extent to which the use
of immunized testimony is protected under the Fifth Amendment.
It is important to remember that the Independent Counsel made
no use of North's immunized testimony in preparing for or conducting the trial; indeed, it did its best to preserve its key witnesses' testimony before North appeared at the Senate hearing.
Moreover, the trial judge admonished witnesses not to rely on anything they heard outside the courtroom. Yet the fact remained that
the witnesses implicated in the Iran-Contra affair, including Robert McFarlane, who had already pled guilty, were purposely immersed in North's Senate testimony by their own lawyers and government colleagues as they prepared for trial. The majority of our
panel held that this purposeful "use" of North's televised testimony by persons (or their counsel) under suspicion or even indictment was enough to violate North's Fifth Amendment right
against self-incrimination and to vitiate the jury verdict of his
guilt. It seems likely that this standard will make it practically im-

'" William Booth, Don Phillips, and Kathy Sawyer, The 1992 Elections: The South,
Wash Post A38 (Nov 5, 1992).
o William Booth, Hastings Tries to Rise Above Impeachment, Wash Post All (Oct 1,
1992).
"'

United States v North, 920 F2d 940 (DC Cir 1990), cert denied, 111 S Ct 2235

(1991).
"'
Haynes Johnson and Tracy Thompson, North Charges Dismissed at Request of
Prosecutor, Wash Post Al (Sept 17, 1991) (prosecutor determined that "the government
[was] not likely, in the unique circumstances here presented, to be able to sustain a successful outcome").
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possible for most public figures to be tried if they have given publicly reported immunized testimony.
Regardless of whether that is a desirable result, it does seem
to set a lower disqualification standard on the basis of exposure to
publicity for witnesses than for jurors. While the standard for jurors is at least theoretically keyed to actual bias, the standard now
in effect for witnesses automatically disqualifies them for prior exposure to immunized testimony, unless the prosecutor can show
that "line for line" the witness-including an unfriendly one, himself under indictment-remembers every word of the defendant's
testimony on his own without being affected in any way by listening to the defendant's publicized immunized testimony. The defendant's alleged partners in crime are effectively given the tools to
blow up the case.1 1 That in turn places a heavier responsibility on
the press covering immunized hearings for the effects of their reporting on any later trial. A substantial risk exists that in major
governmental malfeasance cases, widespread coverage of congressional hearings involving immunized testimony will effectively gut
any possibility of future prosecution. Nonetheless, reporters have
their jobs to do, and no one would suggest that they refrain from
doing it. The benefits of press coverage continue to outweigh its
risks.
IV.

WHO

Is

FOLLOWING WHOSE LEAD?

As a last word, let me turn Professor Schauer's question
around: How much do judges base their own behavior on what reporters say about them? A preposterous question, perhaps, but
several months ago one of my colleagues, Judge Laurence Silberman, attracted a flurry of press coverage by accusing certain reporters of a bias toward activist (liberal) judges and accusing some
of those judges, in turn, of playing to that bias. 1 4 Personally, I
think the media playing field is more level than Judge Silberman
suggests. The editorial pages of the Wall Street Journal and the
Washington Times act as a healthy counterbalance to any liberal
tendencies of other national papers in their court coverage. In fact,
my impression is that the "conservative" judges are treated at least
See id (prosecutor dropped the North prosecution after Robert McFarlane testified
that North's televised testimony had heavily influenced McFarlane's original testimony).
114 See, for example, Sandra Sanchez, Judicial Criticisms, USA Today 3A
(June 15,
1992); Martin Tolchin, Press Is Condemned By a Federal Judge for Court Coverage, NY
Times A13 (June 15, 1992); First Amendment: Does Media Coverage Influence the Outcome of Judicial Decisions?, ABA J 48 (Oct 1992).
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as well by the New York Times and the Washington Post as their
"liberal" counterparts are treated in the other newspapers. I was a
little surprised, though, by how docilely the press reacted to Judge
Silberman's criticisms; it seemed to respond mainly that there was
no proof that the named reporters favored judicial "activists," but
implicitly conceded Judge Silberman's thesis that if they did, it
was deplorable. " 5 Bruce Fein, in supporting Judge Silberman's
thesis, criticized an "obsess[ion] with results" rather than reasons
in the reporting of certain journalists covering the courts. " " Fein
would prefer that reporters concentrate on appellate court rationales and principles of "constitutional or statutory interpretation
that prevent judges from usurping legislative or executive
prerogatives." '
I read this as criticism of the press for not buying into the now
too-familiar debate on judicial activism and restraint, as those
terms are defined by conservative jurists and writers. I believe,
however, that the press is entitled to pick its own news, and norms,
even if I do not always agree with them. It may indeed be that
Americans are more interested in reading about the results of cases
than about the rationales of prominent jurists. More fundamentally, it is not clear to me that individual reporters or newspapers
are bound to be entirely neutral, or to adopt a "fairness doctrine"
inside their own ranks. Certainly they do not do it for politicians.
Why then for judges? Even if it were true that some judges do
curry favor with powerful journalists, would not the remedy lie
with the courts and not the press? Judges, not reporters, have life
tenure and have pledged to uphold the Constitution against all enemies, foreign and domestic-including the press. Is not the theory
behind the First Amendment that the public will choose which of
the judges' rationales it endorses, assuming there is opportunity for
all points of view to be expressed? Surely conservatives have fora
aplenty in Washington and elsewhere, including well-financed
think tanks and national and regional newspapers sympathetic to
their concerns and ever appreciative of their judicial spokespersons. At any rate, I raise the point only as one of contrast. Some
judges worry whether they kowtow too much to the press, not
whether the press kowtows too much to judges.
"' See Tolchin, NY Times at A13 (cited in note 114) (New York Times editor defending fairness and accuracy of its court reporters).
"o Bruce Fein, Yes: The Press Loves Activists, ABA J 48 (Oct 1992).
17
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CONCLUSION

What, then, is the ideal relationship between the press and the
criminal justice system? Certainly the journalist-investigator
should not attempt to copy any theoretical reasonable doubt
"norms" of the criminal justice system; its real norms are, as we
have seen, quite varied, flexible, maneuverable, not always followed
in practice, and certainly not geared to the reasonable doubt standard for 99.44 percent of cases. The norms of the criminal justice
system are not so different from those that undergird other decisionmaking systems and have, on the whole, little guidance to impart to those other systems.
The journalist's job is to present reliable information relevant
to public decisionmaking. Libel laws set outer boundaries on what
journalists can report. Within those boundaries, the responsible
journalist should weigh for herself what kind of information is relevant to public choices. Even that type of self-screening can, of
course, get risky. Should the journalist report that the Cabinet officer's daughter is gay? Is it relevant to anything? Maybe not, but
not because of any analogy to criminal law. Certainly I would not
like to see the same reporter hesitate to report what informed
sources are saying about that Cabinet officer's involvement in an
international financial scandal, even if there is an official investigation underway or even if the officer is on trial for a related offense.
There are indications that, except perhaps in small towns or
rural settings, what newspapers print is not controlling with'jurors.
Real juror bias does exist, though, and the criminal justice system
still has a way to go in developing better techniques to ferret it
out. That problem, however, should not be laid at the media's feet.
A criminal trial serves a distinct function in our society: it imposes
punishment and (usually) stigma on an individual for violating its
laws. It makes no pretense of unearthing all the malfunctioning
processes and misdeeds of others that contributed to the crime and
that may be important for the public to know. That is the job of
good reporting. Thus it may be that the twain should never meet, a
conclusion to which Professor Schauer eventually comes as well,
albeit by a different route.

